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Abstract
We develop a theoretical framework that considers the role played by moral hazard
and the diversity of networks and cultures in the choice of hiring channel. In favoritism
contexts social networks, and particularly strong ties, are adopted as hiring channels for
unskilled jobs and result in wage penalties, while otherwise the opposite happens. We
estimate an endogenous switching model for the case of Senegal’s manufacturing
formal sector and find, consistently with our theoretical predictions in case of
favoritism, that informal hiring channels are preferred to fill unskilled vacancies and are
associated with a wage penalty, especially when ties are stronger.
JEL Classification: O12; J31
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1 Introduction
Why are some workers hired through social networks, while other employees through
formal channels, and what is the effect of the hiring channel on their wages? In this
paper we theoretically explore the circumstances in which either informal1 or formal
hiring channels are preferred and either positive or negative wage differentials emerge,
considering the role played by moral hazard and the diversity of networks and cultures
in the choice of hiring channel. On the empirical side, we investigate the adoption of
social networks as hiring channels and its impact on wages in the case of a develop-
ing country, Senegal, whereas the others contributions to this topic generally focus on
OECD countries.
An impressive number of vacancies are filled through informal hiring channels, which
comprise family, friends, and in general social networks to which individuals belong,
rather than through the formal labor market. Granovetter (1973), Rees (1966) and
Corcoran (1980) find that about half of the jobs in the United States are filled through
personal contacts and Ioannides and Loury (2004) notice that the role played by networks
increased over time. Sociologists and economists have first looked at the supply side of
the labor market. Holzer (1988), for example, show that when multiple search methods
are possible, workers prefer social networks to formal hiring channels, because the former
are less expensive and characterized by a higher probability of being hired than the latter.
On the demand side, the traditional wisdom among economists2 is that informal hiring
channels may help to mitigate selection problems arising in recruitment. For instance,
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Montgomery (1991), Saloner (1985) and Simon andWarner (1992) all argue that informal
hiring channels may reduce information asymmetry between employers and employees
and provide a better matching of unobservable characteristics. Montgomery assumes that
social networks are based on homophily of unobservable characteristics, so that people
tend to refer others like themselves. Saloner’s results rest instead on the referees’ willing-
ness to safeguard their reputation. Simon andWarner posit that the use of informal hiring
channels reduces employers’ uncertainty about applicants productivity.
All these models predict that hiring through social networks should always be preferred
to formal channels. Moreover, the enhanced selection that is guaranteed by informal hir-
ing channels should be specially exploited for vacancies requiring high skills and should
imply wage premia for workers hired through social networks.
However, in the real world, formal and informal hiring channels coexist and their adop-
tion greatly varies in different contexts. First of all, the practice of hiring through social
networks is even more pronounced in developing countries than in industrialized ones.3
Moreover, many empirical studies suggest that vacancies for unskilled occupations are
more likely to be filled through social networks than jobs requiring high skills,4 while
some find the opposite5. Finally, wage differentials imputable to informal hiring channels
are far from being found always positive.6 For instance, Pellizzari (2009) finds that, out
of 15 industrialized countries, in Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands networked work-
ers enjoy wage premia, in Greece, Italy, Portugal and UK they suffer wage penalties, while
in the 8 remaining countries there are no significant wage differentials imputable to the
adopted hiring channel.
The discrepancies between theoretical predictions and empirical studies suggest that
theories focusing on adverse selection overlook some crucial aspect of the phenomenon.
This paper aims at reconciling theory and empirical findings on the choice of hiring
channel and its potential effect on wages. It does so, first of all by taking into account
that, besides selection issues, incomplete information may also imply problems of moral
hazard. Second, it considers that networks differ in their tightness7, while the existing
theoretical literature does not consider the variety of social networks.8 We argue that the
strength of links is important, because tight networks are able to exert peer pressure to
ensure proper behavior of members who are hired through them.9 Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984) show that, when observing employees’ effort is costly for firms, employers need to
increase workers’ expected value of not shirking with respect to shirking. That is, firms
need to rise either the monitoring or the salary of their workers.10 However, the role
played by peer pressure may decrease the monitoring costs for workers hired through
social networks with respect to other employees.11 Third, even networks characterized
by similar tightness may play a very different role in the job market depending on the cul-
ture. There are contexts in which a worker hired through a social network reciprocates the
working opportunity by exertingmore effort than workers hired through the formal chan-
nel, while a culture of favoritism encourages networked employees to work less than the
others.12 Our model integrates all these aspects and explains why either formal or infor-
mal hiring channels are adopted and why either positive or negative wage differentials
may emerge for workers hired through informal channels, depending on circumstances.
Moreover, it accounts for the stylized facts that developing countries rely even more
on social networks as hiring channels than industrialized ones and that informal hiring
channels are often adopted to fill unskilled vacancies.
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The paper also contributes to the empirical literature by investigating the determinants
of hiring channels at worker, network and firm level and the impact of the adopted hir-
ing channel on wages in the Senegalese formal manufacturing sector. While most of the
empirical literature on social networks as hiring channels is largely confined to developed
countries studies, very few studies have analyzed the crucial role of social networks in
less developed countries’ labor markets (notable exceptions are Egypt’s studies by Assaad
(1997) and Wahba and Zenou (2005)) and none takes into account the fact that social
networks differ in their tightness. Moreover, to our knowledge the only existing analysis
of informal hiring channels concerning Sub-Saharan Africa refers to the colonial period
(Fafchamps-and-Moradi (2009)). However, this region is pervaded with informality to a
greater extent than other developing countries13 and social networks play a crucial role
in their labor markets14. At the same time, Senegal is a rare example of a Sub-Saharan
African country characterized by a dynamic economy moving away from the ubiquitous
informality to a market economy, thus providing a unique opportunity to investigate the
remains of informality in an economy that is developing toward formal markets.
Estimating an endogenous switching model,15 we find that informal hiring channels are
preferred to fill unskilled vacancies and are associated with a wage penalty. Moreover, the
probability of having been hired through a social network and the absolute value of wage
penalties is increasing with the strength of ties. These findings are consistent with our
theoretical predictions in contexts where favoritism is widespread.
Section 2 analyzes the case of Senegal, providing details on the data and some descrip-
tive statistics characterizing sampled firms and workers. Section 3 presents a theoretical
framework that accounts for the elements intuitively singled out above and corroborated
by the analysis of rough data. Section 4 presents econometric evidence supporting the
hypotheses and the predictions of our theoretical framework. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Descriptive statistics
The empirical analysis relies on the Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) survey for
Senegal, run by theWorld Bank in 2003. It provides information about 262 firms and 1637
of their workers in the formal16 manufacturing17 sector. One of the salient features of this
data set is that it matches workers and firms, which allows controlling for idiosyncratic
characteristics of both.
Social networks based on family or friends are the main channel of matching between
firms and workers in the data set. On the demand side, the majority of firms use some-
times formal and sometimes informal hiring channels, and 60% of sampled firms declare
to mainly rely on informal networks in order to fill their vacancies. On the supply side,
65% of interviewed workers found their job through social networks.18
In order to get some insights about the phenomenon, it is useful to analyze the charac-
teristics of both firms and workers thoroughly. Some characteristics of the sampled firms
are reported in Table 1, which distinguishes between firms that declare to mainly rely on
formal and on informal hiring. All sampled firms are located in an urban area and 95%
of them in the capital city, reflecting the distribution of manufacturing employees in the
country.19
Enterprises where the owner is also the director of the firm are also those that more
often use informal hiring channels, while bigger firms tend to rely more on formal hiring
channels.
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Table 1 Characteristics of sampled firms by their main hiring channels
Firms mainly hiring through channel:
formal informal Difference Total
total number of interviewed firms 104 152 -48 256
firm located in Dakar 98 145 -47 243
public firm 8 4 4∗ 12
mean number of employees 194 72 122∗∗ 130
(592) (180) (51) (425)
owner and director 59 105 -46∗∗ 164
sector: agro-industry 40 53 -13 93
chemical/paint products 13 17 -4 30
building materials 10 8 2 18
furniture 1 5 -4 6
metals 10 15 -5 25
paper industry 12 24 -12 36
plastics 3 12 -9∗ 15
textile and leather 8 15 -7 23
wood 7 3 4∗ 10
Note: Standard deviation in brackets. Significance levels based on Whicoxon-Mann-Whitney (for continuous variables) and Fisher
exact (for categorical variables) test: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%.
Having noticed these characteristics at the firm level, we now turn to explore the char-
acteristics of sampled workers.20 Table 2 reports available information about sampled
employees, distinguishing between those hired through formal channels and those who
found their job through social networks. Workers who found their job through networks
of relatives or friends are about 65% of interviewed workers. The survey also provides
information concerning two types of social networks. The first one is the network binding
the owner or manager of the firm with employees belonging to her ethnic group.21 The
second one includes members of her extended family working in the firm.22 Rough data
suggest that the ethnic group is one of the social networks whereby workers may be hired,
since employees that belong to the same ethnic group as the head of the firm are 21%
among workers hired through an informal network and 13% in the formal labor market.
Since family ties are likely to be tighter than merely ethnic ones, the comparison between
their effects enables to test the role played by network tightness in the labor market.23
Our data set provides evidence that workers are hired more often through social con-
tacts for jobs requiring lower qualifications. Indeed, 76% of unskilled workers found their
job through their family or friends. The percentage falls to 60% for skilled blue collars and
to 41% for skilled white collars and managers.24 Workers who found their job through
informal contacts are also less educated, less experienced, and younger than employ-
ees hired on the formal labor market. Finally, the mean of the natural logarithm of real
monthly salary at the time of hiring25 is significantly lower for workers hired through
social networks.
While the rigor of econometrics is necessary to disentangle the relative role played
by different variables, the analysis of crude data suggests several potentially relevant
dimensions, which are integrated in the theoretical framework developed in Section 3.
3 Amodel of hiring through formal and informal channels
The need of a theoretical framework accounting for what we observe in reality and in
the data described in Section 2 motivates our modeling exercise. In order to understand
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Table 2 Characteristics of sampled workers by their hiring channel
Workers hired through channel:
formal informal Difference Total
number of workers 555 1018 -463 1573
same ethnicity as firm’s head 71 214 -143∗∗∗ 285
same family as firm’s head 30 150 -120∗∗∗ 180
job: managers 32 23 9∗∗∗ 55
skilled white collar 101 71 30∗∗∗ 172
skilled blue collar 238 351 -113∗∗∗ 589
unskilled workers 183 569 -386∗∗∗ 752
mean education (years) 13.0 10.5 2.5∗∗∗ 11.4
(4.73) (4.62) (0.26) (4.81)
mean previous experience (years) 5.0 4.1 0.9∗∗∗ 4.5
(6.39) (6.06) (0.34) (6.19)
mean age at hiring (years) 29.9 28.8 1.1∗∗∗ 29.2
(7.41) (8.34) (0.42) (8.04)
gender: male 447 840 -393 1287
marital status: married 377 647 -270∗∗ 1024
origin: Dakar 220 426 -206 646
other in Senegal 311 546 -235 857
other 24 45 -21 69
weekly work hours 43.2 43.3 -0.1 43.2
(8.51) (9.98) (0.50) (9.48)
mean ln real monthly salary 11.2 10.9 0.3∗∗∗ 11.0
(0.87) (0.86) (0.05) (0.88)
Note: Standard deviation in brackets. Significance levels based on Whicoxon-Mann-Whitney (for continuous variables) and Fisher
exact (for categorical variables) test: *: 10% **: 5% ***: 1%.
the use of social networks as hiring channels, the key point is investigating why and
when firms and applicants prefer to rely on them. Since adverse selection has long been
investigated in the context of the hiring channel choice without managing to account for
empirical evidence, we abstract from it for the sake of tractability and we focus instead
on other crucial characteristics of the phenomenon that received little attention until
now, like the role played by moral hazard and network characteristics. Moreover, we
simultaneously take into account the choices of employers and applicants.
3.1 Basic model
We model a formal sector firm that can hire labor either through the formal channel or
from a pool of workers who are linked to that firm by a social network.26 The wage is
determined by the bargaining between firm j and worker i.27 Assume that the outcome is
determined by the Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution (Rubinstein 1982), so that the
wage paid to a worker maximizes (wk −wk)η(wk −wk)1−η, where k ∈ {F ,N} is the hiring
channel.
In this function, η is the worker’s bargaining power, wk is the lower bound of wages that
the employee is willing to accept andwk is the wage upper bound that the firm is prepared
to pay the worker hired through channel k. The corresponding wage will be determined
as wk = ηwk + (1 − η)wk . This expression simply says that the agreed wage will be a
linear combination of the two extreme points of the bargaining set, being closer to the top
the higher is the worker’s bargaining power. The lower and upper bounds wk and wk are
determined endogenously, as described below.
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We assume that the firm can observe the worker’s individual output only by costly mon-
itoring her. For the sake of simplicity, for the moment we hypothesize that the worker can
either shirk or exert some effort, i.e., ek ∈ {0, e}, at per unit cost γ . Section 3.2 develops an
extension of the model where the effort exerted may be different between hiring channels
(eN = eF ). Assume that the monitoring technology is such that the worker will be fired
if she is caught shirking, which happens with probability μk when she does. Moreover,
there exists an exogenous probability of separation q, as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) 28.
Denote Uk the life-time expected utility of an unemployed worker and Ek the life-time
expected utility of a worker employed through hiring channel k. The Bellman equation
for a worker hired through the formal channel and not shirking at steady state is:





while that of a shirking worker hired through the same channel would be:







Similarly, the Bellman equation for a worker hired through a social network and not
shirking at steady state is:





Expression (3) resembles (1), except for the parameter ζ ≥ 0. The latter represents the
non-monetary gains that a worker may derive from working with or for a member of her
social networks. This parameter captures the benefits that the worker can get from being
an active member of the network, including gifts in special occasions like weddings and
various kinds of help. 29 The Bellman equation for a worker hired through social networks
and shirking at steady state would be:
rENshirking = wN + ζ − μNϕ −
(
q + μN) (ENshirking − UN) . (4)
In expression (4) two additional parameters play a role with respect to expression (2):
the aforementioned potential non-monetary gains (ζ ) and network tightness (ϕ), which
is the strength that characterizes its links. The idea is that a worker hired through a
social network may feel peer pressure by members of her hiring channel not to compro-
mise its reputation and, if she is caught shirking, she will be punished by the network
that served as hiring channel to an extent that depends on network tightness. Finally, the
Bellman equation for an unemployed worker at steady state is rUk = a (Ek − Uk), where
unemployment benefits are assumed to be null and the job-acquisition rate a exogenous.
Lemma 1 (No-Shirking Conditions). When formal and informal channels are adopted
the no-shirking conditions are respectively:
μF ≥ γ e (r + a + q)wF − γ e (5)
μN ≥ γ e (r + a + q)wN + ζ − γ e + ϕ (r + a + q) (6)
The proof is provided in Appendix A. The no-shirking conditions (5) and (6) suggest
that the intensity of monitoring that maximizes firm’s profit depends on the chosen hiring
channel. This result is a direct consequence of the fact that the utility of workers depends
on their hiring channel. Indeed, when a social network is adopted as hiring channel, its
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tightness affects the level of monitoring inducing effort. Moreover, the larger the non-
monetary benefit enjoyed by networked workers, the lower the monitoring needed to
induce their effort.
In our framework firms always induce effort, since shirking workers are not productive.
The no-shirking conditions (5) and (6) hold as equalities, since this is the value of μk that
maximizes the firm’s profit per worker whenmonitoring is costly.More formally, denote ϑ
labor productivity and ξ the unit cost of monitoring. The Bellman equation for employing
a worker hired through channel k at steady state, assuming that the expected discounted
payoff of having a vacancy is zero, is rk = ϑek − wk − ξμk − qk , such that in the case
of an employee hired on the formal labor market (k = F) eF = e if μF ≥ γ e(r+a+q)wF−γ e , and
eF = 0 if μF < γ e(r+a+q)wF−γ e , while for a worker hired through a social network (k = N)
eN = e if μN ≥ γ e(r+a+q)wN+ζ−γ e+ϕ(r+a+q) , and eN = 0 if μN < γ e(r+a+q)wN+ζ−γ e+ϕ(r+a+q) .
Therefore, per worker profit when the firm hires through respectively formal and
informal channel may be written at equilibrium as:
F = ϑe − w
F
r + q − ξ
γ e (r + a + q)(
wF − γ e) (r + q) (7)
N = ϑe − w
N
r + q − ξ
γ e (r + a + q)[
wN + ζ − γ e + ϕ (r + a + q)] (r + q) (8)
which are assumed to be non-negative.
Proposition 1 (Bargaining Set). The upper and lower bound of the bargaining set are
determined as follows:
1. workers prefer a job through the informal channel if :
wN ≥ wF − ζ (9)
2. firms prefer hiring through social networks if:
wN + ξ γ e (r + a + q)wN + ζ − γ e + ϕ (r + a + q) ≤ w
F + ξ γ e (r + a + q)wF − γ e (10)
Proposition 1, whose proof is provided in Appendix A, formalizes the idea that for infor-
mal hiring to take place, such a transaction must be worthwhile for both the firm and the
worker. In other words, as a familiar saying suggests, ‘it takes two to tango’.
Proposition 2 (Choice of Hiring Channel). The hiring channel is determined as follows:
1. informal hiring channels will be always used if:
• ζ > 0, or
• ζ = 0 and ϕ > 0;
2. informal and formal hiring channels are indifferent if ζ = 0 and ϕ = 0.
Intuitively, informal hiring channels prevail in the presence of non-monetary gains.
Even in their absence, hiring through social networks is preferred when their links are
strong.
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Depending on the values of ζ and ϕ workers hired through the informal channel get
a wage premium or a wage penalty with respect to employees hired through the formal
labor market.
Proposition 3 (Wage Differential). The wage differential between hiring channels is
determined as follows:
1. no wage penalty to workers hired through social networks is possible if ζ = 0;
2. both wage premium and penalty are possible, depending on the bargaining power,
if ζ > 0.
Proposition 3 implies that when workers hired through social networks enjoy some
non-pecuniary gains they may either earn a wage premium or suffer a wage penalty,
consistently with the heterogeneous empirical findings discussed in Section 1. More
specifically, if non-monetary benefits exist, the larger they are, the lower the minimum
wage that workers hired through social networks are willing to accept (wN ) and, at the
same time, the higher the maximum wage that firms are willing to pay to workers hired
through social networks (wN ). The latter is also increasing with the tightness characteriz-
ing the network that served as hiring channel. Indeed, strong links allow firms to monitor
less workers that are subject to peer pressure within their social network.
3.2 The role of culture
We now extent the basic setting presented in Section 3.1 by introducing the potential role
of culture. The idea is that worker’s effort and thus productivity may be influenced by how
she was hired. We now assume that a worker hired through the formal channel chooses
eF ∈ {0, e}, while somebody hired through social networks eN ∈ {0, e + δϕ}. Indeed, the
characteristics of the social network whereby a worker is hired, and namely its tightness
(ϕ), may influence the extent of her effort.
In some contexts workers hired through social networks may be eager to reciprocate
the working opportunity, while elsewhere they may feel that they don’t need to exert as
much effort as the others (i.e., the sign of δ is culturally driven).
In this context, the Bellman equation for a worker hired through social networks and
not shirking at steady state is:




while that of a worker hired through the same channel and shirking is unchanged (see
expression (4) in Section 3.1). The Bellman equations for a worker hired through the for-
mal channel respectively not shirking and shirking are not affected either and correspond
to expressions (1) and (2) in Section 3.1.
Lemma 2 (No-Shirking Conditions - extended to account for culture). When formal
and informal channels are adopted the no-shirking conditions are respectively:
μF ≥ γ e (r + a + q)wF − γ e (11)
μN ≥ γ (e + δϕ) (r + a + q)wN + ζ − γ (e + δϕ) + ϕ (r + a + q) (12)
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If culture is allowed to play a role, the Bellman equation for employing a non-shirking
worker hired through a social network at steady state is modified as follows with respect
to the Section 3.1:
rN = ϑ (e + δϕ) − wN − ξ γ (e + δϕ) (r + a + q)wN + ζ − γ (e + δϕ) + ϕ (r + a + q) − q
N
Therefore, intuitively, with respect to the basic case, when culture is such that pro-
ductivity of workers hired through social networks is higher than that of workers hired
through the formal channel, the lower bound of wages that workers accept (wN ) and the
upper bound of wages that firms are willing to pay (wN ) increase, and the more so the
tighter the network that served as hiring channel. More formally, proposition 4 specifies
the acceptable range of values of the informal wage for making a transaction through this
channel.
Proposition 4 (Bargaining Set - extended to account for culture). The upper and lower
bound of the bargaining set are determined as follows:
1. workers prefer a job through the informal channel if:
wN ≥ wF − ζ + γ δϕ (13)
2. firms prefer hiring through social networks if:
wN − ϑδϕ + ξ γ (e + δϕ) (r + a + q)wN + ζ − γ (e + δϕ) + ϕ (r + a + q) ≤ w
F + ξ γ e (r + a + q)wF − γ e
(14)
If the monitoring cost is relatively low and the cultural context is such that workers
hired through social networks are willing to exert extra effort to reciprocate (δ > 0), the
upper bound is increasing with network tightness, reciprocity, and productivity. If instead
networked workers exert less effort than employees hired through the formal channel
(δ < 0), the upper bound is decreasing with network tightness, the extent of favoritism
(i.e., the absolute value of δ), and productivity.
At the other end of the range, the lower bound is smaller the larger the non-monetary
benefits that the worker gets. When workers hired through social networks are eager to
reciprocate the working opportunity, the lower bound increases with network tightness,
while it decreases when networked workers exert less effort.
Figure 1 depicts the set determined by proposition 4. For wages beyond ŵF , defined as
the point where wN and wN coincide, workers do not want a job through social networks
because firms are not willing to pay them enough through such hiring channel. Only
within the area labeled ‘informal hiring channel’ both sides are willing to use informal
channels.
Proposition 5 (Choice of Hiring Channel - extended to account for culture). When
δ > 0 (i.e., in a culture of gratitude),
1. informal hiring channels will be used:
• always if ϑ ≥ γ − ζ/δϕ, or
• only when wF is below the threshold level ŵF if ϑ + ζ/δϕ < γ ;









Figure 1 The choice of hiring channel and the wages of workers hired through formal and informal
hiring channels.
2. informal and formal hiring channels are indifferent if ϑ + ζ/δϕ < γ and wF = ŵF ;
3. formal hiring channels will be used otherwise.
When δ < 0 (i.e., in a culture of favoritism),
1. informal hiring channels will be used:
• always if γ ≥ ϑ + ζ/δϕ, or
• only when wF is below the threshold level ŵF if γ − ζ/δϕ < ϑ ;
2. informal and formal hiring channels are indifferent if γ − ζ/δϕ < ϑ and wF = ŵF ;
3. formal hiring channels will be used otherwise.
Indeed, only informal hiring channel are used when the area labeled ‘informal hiring
channel’ becomes open-ended, that is when either ζ > ϕδ(γ − ϑ) or, if ζ → 0, when
δ(γ − ϑ) ≤ 0. Intuitively, the first condition suggests that social networks prevail as
hiring channel when non-monetary gains from informal hiring are substantial. Since in
developing countries social networks are often very important and informal exchanges
widespread, the relative weight of non-monetary benefits versus salarymay be substantial.
Therefore, our theoretical framework predicts that informal hiring channels should be
even more common in developing countries than in industrialized countries. At the same
time, since the same non-monetary gains impact on workers’ utility more if their salary
is lower, social networks should be more often adopted as hiring channel for less skilled
jobs.
Even when networks do not provide high non-monetary benefits, only informal hiring
channels are adopted if ϑ ≥ γ when δ > 0 and if γ ≥ ϑ when δ < 0. If the spread between
productivity and cost of effort of a worker is increasing with her skills, our framework
predicts that informal hiring channels should be preferred to fill skilled vacancies, when
the culture is such that a worker hired through a social network reciprocates the work-
ing opportunity by exerting more effort than workers hired through the formal channel
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(δ > 0). At the same time, in contexts of favoritism (δ < 0) they should be preferred for
unskilled jobs, while skilled vacancies should be filled through formal channels.
Figure 1 shows that the stronger the willingness to reciprocate a job opportunity
obtained through social networks and the tightness of the social network adopted as hir-
ing channel, the higher can be the wage of a worker hired through informal channels.
The opposite is true the stronger the culture of favoritism and the tighter the social net-
work adopted as hiring channel. When the bargaining power is limited, the salary earned
by workers hired through the informal channel decreases with the non-monetary gains
workers enjoy, while, if networked employees have strong bargaining power, the effect is
weaker and the more so the larger the non-monetary gains.
We now formally assess when workers hired through the informal channel get a wage
premium or a wage penalty with respect to employees hired through the formal channel.
Proposition 6 (Wage Differential - extended to account for culture). When δ > 0,
1. both wage premium and penalty are possible, depending on the bargaining power,
if ζ > γ δϕ;
2. only wage premium to workers hired through social networks is possible if ζ < γ δϕ.
When δ < 0,
1. both wage premium and penalty are possible, depending on the bargaining power.
Proposition 6 suggests, that depending on the parameter values, informal hiring chan-
nels may have either positive or negative consequences on salaries, as hinted by the
empirical literature. In particular, wage penalties should be more likely in contexts of
favoritism and wage premia in the opposite case.30 Even in case of low bargaining power,
workers hired through social networks earn for sure wage premia when they recipro-
cate the working opportunity by exerting more effort than workers hired through formal
channels if non-monetary gain don’t exist. In such a culture, the value of wage premia are
ceteris paribus positively affected by network tightness and the intensity of reciprocity. On
the other hand, in contexts of favoritism, workers hired through informal hiring channels
can get wage premia only if the bargaining power is particularly strong.
4 Hiring channel choice and wage differentials in Senegal
The model developed in Section 3 provides a theoretical framework to understand the
different mechanisms that may play a role in the choice of hiring channel and the way
it affects wages. In particular, it explains why wither informal or formal hiring channels
are preferred and wither positive or negative wage differentials emerge for workers hired
through social networks, depending on circumstances. The model predicts that, condi-
tional on being employed, in favoritism contexts social networks are likely to be adopted
as hiring channels for unskilled jobs and to result in wage penalties and even more, the
stronger the ties, while otherwise the opposite happens.
We now turn to empirically analyze in a concrete case whether the choice of hiring
channel and wage differentials are consistent with the theoretical predictions either in
a favoritism or in a reciprocity context. We exploit the Senegalese data to investigate
the determinants of hiring channel choice and wage differentials imputable to the hiring
channel.31
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A fundamental concern undermines the analysis: is the hiring channel choice exogenous
to unobservable determinants of wage? If hiring channel and salary share some unobserv-
able determinants, sample selection32 biases the estimation of coefficients. If for instance
less able individuals are more likely to be hired through social networks than through for-
mal channels and therefore receive lower wages ceteris paribus, then failing to control for
this correlation would yield biased estimates of the impact of hiring channel on wages.
Besides the potential sample selection bias, a further concern is that the hiring channel
may have an indirect impact on the salary through the standard wage determinants. For
example, the role played by a worker’s education on her wage may be weaker for an appli-
cant hired through social networks than for one hired on the formal labor market. The
econometric framework addressing at the same time the endogenous sample selection
and the switching impact that wage determinants may have for workers hired through
different channels is the endogenous switching model (see Heckman 1979). Roughly
speaking, it is a treatment effect model that allows for a full set of interaction terms
between the hiring channel and the standard determinants of wage. Some details on the
endogenous switching econometric model are given in Appendix B.
4.1 Specification of estimation
To take advantage of the richness of the available data, we take into account not only
variables at the individual level as in the standard endogenous switching model , but also
firms’ characteristics.33 Therefore, the system of equations of interest is as follows:
ln wFi,j = βFworkerXi + βFfirmj + Fi,j (15)
ln wNi,j = βNworkerXi + βNfirmj + Ni,j (16)
H∗i,j = γZi,j + ui,j (17)
where the dependent variable of the wage regressions is the natural logarithm of the real
monthly wage at the time of hiring, Xi are the regressors at worker i level, j the charac-
teristics of firm j, and Zi,j includes Xi, j and potentially instrumental variables that allow
the parametric identification. In particular, the vector Xi is represented by worker i’s years
of education and experience before the current job, gender, marital status, place of origin,
number of hours worked per week,34 type of vacancy filled when hired, whether worker
i is a relative of firm’s manager or owner, or does not, but belongs to her ethnic group.
The vector j includes firm j’s size, sector, and three dummy variables taking unit value
respectively if firm j is located in Dakar, if a large share of its capital belongs to the State,
and if its owner personally runs the firm (see Table 6 in Appendix B for a summary of
variables).
While the available data allow controlling for a great variety of observable charac-
teristics both at worker and firm level, it may still be the case that some unobserved
characteristics differ between individuals hired through different hiring channels. The
best available exclusion restriction is a dummy taking unit value when a worker was over
40 years old when hired.35 The identifying assumption is that this variable is legitimately
excluded from wage regressions (15) and (16), but significant in the selection equation
(17). While by definition this hypothesis is not testable, economic reasoning supports
our choice of this exclusion restriction. Indeed, it is standard to posit that age should not
be relevant in wage determination once experience and education are accounted for.36
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The hypothesis that relatively old workers37 looking for a job are more likely to be hired
through informal rather than formal channels is supported byDelattre and Sabatier (2007)
and it is consistent with our theoretical framework in contexts of favoritism. Indeed,
older people have larger and tighter social networks available than younger workers.
Moreover, the burden of reconversion of their competences, which is required by a new
working environment, tends to increase the spread between their productivity and their
cost of effort with respect to younger workers, so that formal hiring channels are hardly
used, while peer pressure consequent to the adoption of informal hiring channels may
compensate it.
Finally, the observed dichotomous realization of the latent variable H∗i,j is whether each
sampled worker was hired through social networks (Hi,j = 1) or not (Hi,j = 0):
Hi,j =
{
1 if H∗i,j > 0
0 otherwise
4.2 Econometric results
Table 3 shows the results for the simultaneous estimation of equations (15), (16), and
(17). The second column of the table reports the coefficients of the determinants of the
hiring channel, which correspond to the vector of parameters γ in equation (17). The
determinants of salary for workers hired through social networks, corresponding to βN s
in equation (16), are reported column four. Those for employees hired through formal
channels, corresponding to βFs in equation (15), are presented in the sixth column.
Our main object of interest in Table 3 is the type of social network whereby a worker
is hired. A relative of the owner or manager of the firm ceteris paribus has significantly
greater chances of being hired through informal hiring channels. At the same time, rela-
tives suffer a substantial wage penalty.38 The role played by kinship, possibly the tightest
existing network, reflects the theoretical prediction of our framework that the tighter the
social network that serves as hiring channel, the larger the potential wage penalties suf-
fered by networked workers, in contexts where favoritism is widespread.39 Indeed, the
fact of belonging to the same ethnic group as the firm’s head (without being a relative) has
not significant impact once kinship is taken into account.
Table 3 clearly indicates that the use of social networks as hiring channel greatly varies
with the type of vacancy to be filled, a stylized fact described in Section 1. Unskilled work-
ers have a significantly higher probability of being hired through social networks than
skilled blue collars (the category of reference), while the opposite is true for skilled white
collars. Such result verifies the theoretical implications of the model that are developed
in Section 3.2. If the spread between productivity and cost of effort of workers is decreas-
ing with their skills, and the potential non-monetary gains quite large with respect to
unskilled workers’ monetary wage, networks are likely to be adopted as hiring channel
despite favoritism, while the opposite is true for skilled white collar workers. Managers
are not significantly more likely to be hired through formal rather than informal channels,
probably because the two countervailing effects, namely large non-monetary benefits and
high productivity combined with very costly monitoring, compensate each other.
Whatever the hiring channel, the coefficients of the wage regressions realistically show
that a worker earns significantly more if hired as manager or a skilled white collar and
less if hired as unskilled worker than if she is hired as skilled blue collar. However, the
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Table 3 Endogenous switchingmodel: determinants of the choice of hiring channel and of
the wage for workers hired through formal and informal hiring channels
Choice of Wage regression for workers
informal hiring hired through:
channel social networks formal channel
same family as firm’s head 0.476∗∗∗ (0.151) -0.297∗∗ (0.133) -0.216∗ (0.115)
only same ethnicity as firm’s head 0.081 (0.154) 0.025 (0.089) 0.178 (0.113)
job: manager -0.458 (0.287) 0.629∗ (0.335) 0.486∗∗∗ (0.107)
skilled white collar -0.336∗∗ (0.145) 0.436∗∗∗ (0.138) 0.197∗∗ (0.101)
unskilled 0.252∗∗ (0.112) -0.434∗∗∗ (0.075) -0.192∗∗ (0.087)
education (years) -0.030∗∗ (0.012) 0.040∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.057∗∗∗ (0.009)
previous experience (years) -0.063∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.043∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.025∗ (0.015)
previous experience sq. (years) 0.002∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.002∗∗ (0.001) -0.001 (0.001)
age over 40 at hiring 0.304∗∗ (0.141)
origin: Dakar -0.054 (0.265) 0.134 (0.217) 0.040 (0.259)
other in Senegal -0.215 (0.266) 0.100 (0.074) 0.044 (0.257)
married 0.108 (0.092) 0.100 (0.074) 0.162∗∗∗ (0.066)
gender: male -0.042 (0.114) -0.019 (0.083) 0.064 (0.087)
hours worked 0.005 (0.005) 0.000 (0.003) 0.003 (0.004)
firm located in Dakar -0.397∗ (0.211) 0.654∗∗∗ (0.215) 0.721∗∗∗ (0.190)
ln of n.employees -0.110∗∗∗ (0.039) 0.132∗∗∗ (0.032) 0.058∗∗ (0.029)
owner and director 0.110 (0.110) -0.126∗ (0.073) -0.052 (0.073)
TFP at hiring 0.015 (0.156) 0.360∗∗∗ (0.120) 0.477∗∗∗ (0.126)
public firm 0.051 (0.253) -0.037 (0.230) -0.010 (0.131)
intercept 1.260∗∗∗ (0.469) 9.675∗∗∗ (0.328) 9.000∗∗∗ (0.398)






Note: Robust Standard Errors in brackets, clustered by firm.
Significance levels: *: 10% **: 5% ***: 1%.
magnitude of the coefficients differs between hiring channels, a point that we will further
investigate later on in this section.
Longer education is associated with a lower probability of being hired through social
networks and the use of informal hiring channels is a decreasing and convex func-
tion of experience prior hiring.40 This feature is consistent with the prediction of
our theoretical framework that higher productivity increases the incidence of formal
channels. Education and experience, the classical Mincerian wage determinants, as
expected significantly increase wages, whatever the hiring channel whereby a worker
was hired.
As argued in Section 4.1, even controlling for workers’ experience, people over 40 years
old are significantly more likely to have found their job through informal rather than for-
mal channels, consistently with the observation that elder people seldom get a job on the
formal labor market, a phenomenon rationalized by our theoretical framework.
We control for marital status, which is not a significant determinant of the hiring
channel and does not affect wages of workers hired through social networks. How-
ever, workers hired on the formal labor market enjoy significantly higher wages if they
are married.41
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Workers’ gender, place of origin, and hours worked per week are maintained as control
variables at the individual level, but they are never significant.
Table 3 also shows that there are a number of firms’ characteristics affecting the choice
of the hiring channel and wages. The location of a firm in Dakar rather than in other
towns decreases the likelihood of hiring somebody through informal hiring channels.42
At the same time, employees working in a firm in Dakar gain significantly higher wages.43
The size of the firm, in terms of total number of employees, has a significantly negative
impact on the probability of being hired through informal channels and a positive one
on wages.44 This is consistent with our theoretical predictions, since in small firms the
recruiter and the employees tend to work closely, while in large firms peer pressure is less
effective.
Workers employed by a firm run by its owner are not significantly more likely to be
hired through social networks, but they earn less ceteris paribus. Indeed, a manager may
get positive utility out of hiring people belonging to her social networks, even in cases
when the choice of informal hiring channels does not maximize the firm’s expected profit,
and may hire too often workers through her social networks. Instead, the utility of a
director who is also the owner directly depends also on firm’s profit and principal-agent
distortions are avoided: she uses her social networks as hiring channel only when conve-
nient and she pays her networked employees what is needed to induce their effort and not
more than that.
To account for time effects due to the fact that surveyed workers were hired in different
years, we control for the total factor productivity change, which is as expected positively
strongly correlated with salaries. Finally, we control for firms’ public capital and sector.
At the bottom of Table 3 are reported the estimated correlation coefficients between
residuals of the regression for the choice of the hiring channel and for wages. The cor-
relation between the residuals of the selection equation (17) and the wage regression
for workers hired through formal channels (15), ρF , is not significantly different from
zero. However, the correlation between the residuals of the selection equation and the
wage regression for workers hired through informal channels (16), ρN , is significantly
negative. Therefore, selection is endogenous and, in particular, workers hired through
social networks ceteris paribus suffer a significant wage penalty due to unobservable
determinants.
A visual way to see the wage penalty due to unobservable factors that is suffered by
workers who got their job through social networks is to compare the true distribution of
wage earned by workers hired through informal channels with the unconditional expected
wage for the same subsample, i.e., E (ln wNi,j) = β̂NworkerXi+ β̂N firmj. Figure 2 shows that the
true distribution of wages of the subsample of workers hired through informal channels is
shifted toward lower wages with respect to the unconditional wage distribution predicted
for the same workers. However, the distribution of expected wages for the subsample
of workers hired through social networks conditional on the dependent variable being
observed, i.e., E (ln wNi,j |Hi,j = N) = β̂NworkerXi + β̂Nfirmj + σ̂N ρ̂Nf (γ̂Zi,j)/F(γ̂Zi,j), fits quite
well the true distribution of wages for the same subsample. The difference between the
unconditional and the conditional expected wage distribution is precisely the negative
selection effect of informal hiring channels.
In order to reach a conclusion about whether all in all informal hiring channels imply
on average wage penalties in the Senegalese manufacturing sector, the switching impact











6 8 10 12 14 16
ln real monthly salary
observed wage distribution for informal hiring channel
unconditional expected wage distribution for same subsample
conditional expected wage distribution for same subsample
Figure 2 True distribution of wages for workers hired through informal hiring channels and
distribution of unconditional and conditional expected wages for the same subsample of workers.
of observable wage determinants has to be taken into account, too. We therefore com-
pare the estimated parameters β̂N and β̂F of Table 3 to asses whether the differences
are statistically significant. Table 4 shows that informal hiring channels also entail a
wage penalty due to observable determinants, but only through the switching impact of
unskilled jobs.
Table 4 Switching impact of the hiring channel on wages: difference between estimated
coefficients of wage determinants for workers hired through informal and formal channels
̂βN − ̂βF
same family as firm’s head -0.082 (0.254)
only same ethnicity as firm’s head -0.153 (0.175)
job: manager 0.143 (0.428)
skilled white collar 0.239 (0.210)
unskilled -0.242∗∗ (0.113)
education (years) -0.017 (0.056)
previous experience (years) 0.018 (0.040)
previous experience sq. (years) -0.001 (0.002)
origin: Dakar 0.094 (0.328)
Senegal 0.056 (0.425)
married -0.062 (0.119)
gender: male -0.083 (0.134)
hours worked -0.004 (0.028)
firm located in Dakar -0.067 (0.335)
ln of n.employees 0.074 (0.078)
owner and director 0.074 (0.110)
TFP at hiring -0.117 (0.170)
public firm -0.027 (0.239)
intercept 0.675 (2.538)
Note: Bootstrap Standard Errors in brackets. Significance levels: *: 10% **: 5% ***: 1%.
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Jointly considering our results concerning the unobservable and observable wage deter-
minants for workers hired through social networks and formal channels, we can conclude
that the former ones suffer a significant wage penalty.
5 Conclusions
This paper sheds light on the role played by social networks as hiring channel and on wage
differentials between employees hired through formal and informal hiring channels. It
contributes to the theoretical literature on informal hiring channels and to the empirical
literature on social networks as hiring channels in developing countries.
From a theoretical point of view, we focus on the role played by moral hazard and allow
for heterogeneity of networks’ tightness. Our framework helps to interpret the fact that
firms and workers rely sometimes on formal hiring channels and sometimes on informal
ones, as well as the rather mixed findings of the empirical literature on the impact that the
hiring channel has on wages. In particular, the choice of the hiring channel varies with the
development and the culture of a country, with the characteristics of networks available
as hiring channel and with the type of vacancy to be filled. In contexts of favoritism, social
networks are predicted to be mainly adopted as hiring channel to fill unskilled vacancies;
moreover, such jobsmay be associated with wage penalties and themore so the tighter the
network that served as hiring channel. However, when skilled workers are hired through
informal hiring channel, they are likely to get wage premia, and the more so the tighter
the network. The opposite is predicted to happen in a culture where reciprocity prevails.
We empirically verify the implications of the model in the particularly interesting case
of the Senegalese formal manufacturing sector.While the analysis of a single country does
not allow to study the relationship between the development of formal institutions and
the use of informal hiring channels, this paper could be the first step in further research
on the cross-country analysis, since similar surveys exist for many countries. Our econo-
metric results support the theoretical predictions that, conditional on being employed,
when favoritism is widespread social networks are often exploited as hiring channel for
unskilled jobs and when non-monetary gains are likely to be large (like in the case of rel-
atives of the firm’s head or in small firms). Formal hiring channels are instead adopted for
filling skilled vacancies and when the required competences are higher. Finally, we find
that workers hired through social networks suffer a wage penalty, which is increasing in
absolute value with tie strength.45
From a policy perspective, it is important not only to investigate whether workers hired
through social networks have wage penalties or premia imputable to their hiring chan-
nel, but also to understand the extent of the non-monetary benefits that they may enjoy.
Moreover, wage differentials crucially depend on the bargaining power of workers and
firms, so that the latter could represent a lever for policy intervention. Finally, an aspect
that is not developed in the theoretical framework, but that plays a crucial role as far as
policy is concerned, is that there may be situations where applicants don’t have access to
both hiring channels.
Further research could take into account some peculiar features implied by the use of
the extended family as a hiring channel. For instance, family ties not only are very strong,
but also provide almost full commitment among network members. If the chief of a firm
guarantees employment to her relatives, the pooling of business risk46 within the family
should be considered, too.
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Finally, a fundamental step would be taking into account the multi-dimensionality of
concerns arising from incompleteness of information in the labor market and developing
a theoretical framework that takes simultaneously into account moral hazard and selec-
tion problems. The predictions of a such model could then be empirically tested in order
to disentangle the relative weight of the two. Indeed, a key difference between moral
hazard and selection problems is that the latter fades away over time, while the former
does not.
Appendix A Theoretical appendix
Proof of lemma1. The worker chooses whether to shirk (i.e., ek = 0) or not (i.e., ek = e)
by maximizing her utility.
If she was hired through formal channels, she does not shirk if EFno−shirking ≥ EFshirking ,
that is if:(
wF − γ e) (r + a)
r (r + a + q) ≥
wF (r + a)
r
(
r + a + q + μF) .
Therefore, the no-shirking condition for workers hired on the formal labor market is
expression (5).
If she was hired through a social network, she does not shirk if ENno−shirking ≥ ENshirking ,
that is if:(
wN + ζ − γ e) (r + a)
r (r + a + q) ≥
(
wN + ζ − μNϕ) (r + a)
r
(
r + a + q + μN) .
Thus, the no-shirking condition for workers hired through social networks is
expression (6).
Proof of proposition 1. For hiring through social networks to arise, both the firm and the
worker should prefer it:
1. the worker will accept a job from the informal channel if her life-time expected
utility when hired through social networks is greater than or equal to what she
could get if she was hired through the formal channel, that is, if EN ≥ EF :(
wN + ζ − γ e) (r + a)
r (r + a + q) ≥
(
wF − γ e) (r + a)
r (r + a + q)
which implies expression (9); wN is the lower bound of wages fulfilling this
condition.
2. the firm prefers hiring through social networks, if per worker profits when hiring
through informal channels (8) are greater than or equal to per worker profits when
hiring through formal ones (7), that is, if N ≥ F :
ϑe − wN
r + q −ξ
γ e (r + a + q)[
wN + ζ − γ e + ϕ (r + a + q)] (r + q) ≥ ϑe − wFr + q −ξ γ e (r + a + q)(wF − γ e) (r + q)
which implies expression (10); wN is the upper bound of wages fulfilling this
condition.
Table 5 summarizes the variables introduced in the model.
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Table 5 Description of variables used in the theoretical framework (Section 3)
Variable Support Index
k Hiring channel k ∈ {F,N}
ηi Worker’s bargaining power 0 ≤ ηi ≤ 1 i = 1, ..., n
γ Worker’s cost of effort γ > 0
eki Worker’s effort e
F
i ∈ {0, e}, k ∈ {F,N} and i = 1, ..., n
eNi ∈ {0, e} [basic framework]
eNi ∈
{
0, e + δϕi,j
}
[extended framework]
ϑ Productivity of effort ϑ > 0
ζi,j Non-monetary benefit ζi,j ≥ 0 i = 1, ..., n and j = 1, ...,m
ϕi,j Network tightness 0 < ϕi,j ≤ 1 i = 1, ..., n and j = 1, ...,m
δ Cultural factor δ ∈ (−∞,+∞) [extended framework]
μki,j Probability of monitoring 0 ≤ μki,j ≤ 1 k ∈ {F,N}, i = 1, ..., n and j = 1, ...,m
ξj Unit cost of monitoring ξj > 0 j = 1, ...,m
q Probability of separation 0 ≤ q ≤ 1
a Job acquisition rate 0 ≤ a ≤ 1
wki,j Worker’s salary w
k
i,j > 0 k ∈ {F,N}, i = 1, ..., n and j = 1, ...,m
Appendix B Empirical appendix
Endogenous switching models can be estimated one equation at a time either by two-
step least square or maximum likelihood estimation. However, both of these estimation
methods are inefficient. An efficient alternative is the full information maximum like-
lihood method (FIML) that simultaneously estimates binary and continuous parts of
the model.47 Endogenous switching models describe the behavior of an agent with two
regression equations, and a criterion function that determines which regime of wages the
agent faces:
ln wFi = βFXi + Fi (18)
ln wNi = βNXi + Ni (19)
H∗i = γZi + ui (20)
where wFi is the wage of individual i who was hired through a formal channel, while wNi is
the wage of individual iwho was hired through some social network.H∗i is the latent vari-
able that determines the hiring channel of individual i. Xi is a vector of individual charac-
teristics that is thought to influence the individual wage, while Zi is a vector of character-
istics that influences the decision regarding the hiring channel. The parameter vectors are
βN , βF , and γ . Finally, Fi , Ni , and ui are the disturbance terms. Notice that the impact of
the hiring channel does not show up as a dummy variable in wage regressions, but rather
in the fact that the constant term and the β-parameters may differ between the sample of
workers hired through formal channels and the sample of workers hired through social
networks (i.e., βN = βF ). The difference in the constants yields the difference in aver-
age wages if a networked and a formally hired worker had Xi = 0. The difference in the
β-parameters represents how the returns to different observable wage determinants vary
depending on the hiring channel. The observed dichotomous realization (Hi) of the latent
variable H∗i determining the hiring channel of individual i has the following form:
Hi =
{
1 if H∗i > 0
0 otherwise (21)
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As in any model entailing latent variables, it is necessary to take care of identifica-
tion. Endogenous switchingmodels are identified by construction through non-linearities
introduced by the selection equation (20). However, the goodness of estimations com-
pletely relies on the parametric assumptions about the distribution of error terms.
Therefore, it is often preferred to add one or more exclusion restrictions. They are
imposed by the researcher, based on economic intuition. By their very nature, exclusion
restrictions are not testable, but indirectly. Therefore, Zi may include some or all variables
in Xi, plus at least one additional variable that is legitimately excluded in wage regressions
(18) and (19).
The main assumption of FIML is that Fi , Ni , and ui have a trivariate normal distribu-





σuF σ 2F .
σuN . σ 2N
⎤⎥⎦
where σ 2u is the variance of the error term in the selection equation (20), and σ 2F and σ 2N
are the variances of the error terms in the regression equations (18) and (19,) respectively.
σuF is the covariance of ui and Fi , and σuF is the covariance of ui and Ni . The covari-
ance between Fi and Ni is not defined, as wFi and wNi are never observed for the same
worker.
To see whether sample selection is endogenous or exogenous, the correlation coeffi-
cients between residuals in each of the wage regressions and the hiring channel choice









If the unobserved factors determining the hiring choice are not correlated with unob-
served determinants of wage, the selection is exogenous. In this case, the sorting
into workers hired through formal and informal channel is random and there is no
risk of a sample selection bias. The adoption of an endogenous switching model pro-
vides also crucial information concerning the indirect impact of the hiring channel on
wages. Indeed, the switching model estimates a full set of interaction terms between
the hiring channel of each worker and the impact of education, experience, and the
other regressors in the wage equations. Therefore, for each wage determinant it is
possible to assess whether its impact is dependent or independent of the channel
whereby workers were hired. The combination of the switching impact of observable
determinants of wage and the unobserved factors allows to draw a conclusion con-
cerning the existence of a wage penalty or premium to workers hired through social
networks.
Table 6 shows a summary of variables.
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Table 6 Description of variables used in the empirical analysis (Sections 2 and 4)
Variables Description
Firms:
Sector Categorical variable indicating the manufacturing sector to which a
firm belongs
Location Dummy variable indicating whether a firm is located in Dakar or elsewhere
Public firms Dummy variable categorizing a firm as public if more than 45% of its
capital belongs to State
Owner and director Dummy variable indicating whether the owner of a firm is also its director
or manager
Mainly informal hiring channels Number of firms that declared to mainly hire through informal channels
Number of employees Number of employees working in a firm
Workers:
Education Number of years of education
Previous experience Number of year of experience before being hired in current firm
Age Worker’s age at hiring time
Gender Dummy variable indicating worker’s gender
Origin Categorical variable indicating worker’s place of origin
Marital status Dummy variable indicating whether a worker is married
Same ethnicity as firm’s head Dummy variable indicating whether a worker belongs to the same ethnic
group as the owner or the manager running the firm
Same family as firm’s head Dummy variable indicating whether a worker belongs to the extended family
of the owner or the manager running the firm
Job Categorical variable indicating the type of job for which a worker was hired
Hours worked Number of hours worked per week
Ln real monthly salary Natural logarithm of worker’s monthly salary when she was hired, adjusted
for HCPI
Hiring channel Dummy variable stating whether a worker was hired through social network
Endnotes
1We follow the literature in using the expression ‘informal hiring channel’ to indicate that
a social network served as information channel for a hiring.
2See Fernandez et al. (2000) for an interesting review of economic and sociological com-
peting theories providing a rational for the use of informal hiring channels.
3See Ben-Porath (1980) and Fafchamps (2006), who suggests that reliance on interper-
sonal relationships and networks can be seen as a symptom that formal institutions do
not work well.
4See Rees (1966), Rees and Schultz (1970), Corcoran (1980), Banerjee (1984), Pistaferri
(1999), Antoninis (2006), Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006), and Pellizzari (2009).
5Kugler (2003), for example, argues that the use of referrals is more widespread in high-
skilled occupations.
6While Simon andWarner (1992) and Kugler (2003) conclude that workers hired through
social networks get wage premia with respect to employees hired through formal chan-
nels, penalties are found by Pistaferri (1999) and Bentolila et al (2010).
7A tight network is characterized by strong ties. Different concepts of strong ties popu-
late the literature. Hennig and Lieberg (1996) andWahba and Zenou (2005) define strong
ties as those based on a repeated and regular relationship, while Grieco (1987), Lin (1999)
and others measure the strength of the ties by the degree of commitment, reciprocity,
trust and mutual obligation. Our preferred notion is the one proposed by Granovetter
(1973): “The strength of a tie is a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the
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emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which
characterize the tie”.
8One recent exception is Zenou (2011), where geographical distance plays the role of
tightness.
9Several studies support this insight. Adler and Kwon (2002) suggest that tight networks
encourage compliance with rules and reduce the need for formal controls. Similarly,
Grieco (1987) argues that social networks can reinforce social control at the work
place. Kirabo and Schneider (2011) emphasize that social networks reduce moral hazard
through social punishment or social collateral even in developed countries. Moreover,
Fisman (2003) provides evidence that enforcement is particularly effective within ethnic
groups in Africa. Finally, Binzel and Fehr (2010), Glaeser et al. (1990), Barr (2004) and
Miller and Rosenbaum (1997) provide experimental evidence of the positive relationship
between social proximity and trustworthiness.
10In the Ivorian manufacturing sector the trade-off between wage and monitoring has
been analyzed by Azam and Lesueur (1997).
11In enriching the employer search framework with the efficiency wage theory, we carry
out a step along the research path wished by Sicilian (1995). In a similar spirit Kugler
(2003) also argues that referees can exert peer pressure on co-workers and thus lower
monitoring cost within a matching framework.
12In a sense, the ‘cultural parameter’ in the theoretical framework presented in Section 3
captures what Loury (2006) interprets as due to two different types of links.
13An example of the economic relevance of informality in Africa is provided by Azam
et al (2001) concerning the credit market.
14Luke and Munshi (2006) and Magruder (2010) find that traditional social networks,
such as those based on kinship, are pivotal for labor markets respectively in Kenya and
South Africa. Barr and Oduro (2002) stress the importance of ethnic networks for labor
outcomes in Ghana.
15This empirical approach to our knowledge has only been applied to investigating infor-
mal hiring channels by Delattre and Sabatier (2007). They find that in France previously
unemployed people suffer a wage penalty imputable to the use of strong ties as hiring
channel.
16The survey defines the formal sector as made up by registered firms. However, there
are many other firms that do not officially exist (and thus do not pay taxes). The latter
firms make up the so-called informal sector of the economy, which represents a notable
part of the economy and employs a great number of workers. Data available for 2001 indi-
cate that it represented almost 55% of GDP and that about 1.2 million people worked in
informal firms. However, the informal sector of the economy is likely to hire almost exclu-
sively through social networks. Thus, the formal sector is a more interesting ground to
pin down the determinants of firms’ choices concerning the hiring channel.
17The fact that sampled firms belong to the manufacturing sector implies that it is not
possible to reach conclusions about the overall Senegalese economy. However, the man-
ufacturing sector is a large part of it, accounting for 12% of GDP in 2008 (African
Economic Outlook 2009). The survey is designed to be representative and to adequately
cover SMEs.
18Notice that the focus of this paper is on the hiring channel and not on the characteris-
tics of the contract hold by workers. Indeed, the ICA survey does not provide information
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on workers’ contract, i.e., whether it is written and complete, whether it specifies benefits
and social insurance, etc. However, Combarnous (2001) shows that in Côte d’Ivoire work-
ers who found their job through informal channels usually have incomplete contracts,
while employees holding complete contracts often applied to a vacancy announcement.
19Indeed, more than 2 million people live in Dakar, while less than 250 thousands in
the other cities. Thus, the concentration in Dakar of interviewed workers is almost
representative.
20Notice that the information available concerns neither the pool of applicants, nor just-
hired workers, but workers employed at the time the survey took place.
2199% of sampled workers answered the question about whether they belong to the same
ethnic group as that of the firm manager or owner. Notice that the survey does not report
the ethnic group of interviewed workers. Senegal has a wide variety of ethnic groups. The
main ethnic groups are the Wolof (41%), the Fula and Toucouleur (26%), and the Serer
(15%).
22As in the case of ethnic group, 99% of workers answered to the question ‘Are you a rela-
tive of the firmmanager or owner?’. Unfortunately, the precise type of link is not specified
in the survey.
23Unfortunately, the data on each individual’s social links are not available. Therefore,
we proxy network tightness based on the available information, like Patacchini and
Zenou (2012).
24The survey categorizes workers into ten types of jobs. We group them into four
occupational categories: manager, skilled white collar (engineer, scientist, economist, pro-
grammer, mathematician, accountant), skilled blue collar and other skilled (technician,
supervisor, maintenance and repairing man, medical staff, clerk, secretary), and unskilled
(other production worker, guard, cook).
25Real wages are computed adjusting reported salaries at the time of hiring for the har-
monized consumer price index, provided by the Senegalese Forecasting and Statistics
Direction (Direction de la Prévision et de la Statistique). Notice that the questionnaire
asks workers to report their salary at the time of hiring, which may imply a recall bias.
26Table 5 in Appendix A summarizes the variables introduced in the model.
27In the mathematical expressions that follow i and j are omitted for the sake of
readability.
28Efficiency wage theories are based on the idea that low wages may have a negative
incentive effect. Employers may then be reluctant to cut wages, even in the presence
of an excess supply of labor, because reducing wages may affect productivity more than
proportionately and increase the cost of labor. Efficiency wage models may provide a
microfoundation for Keynesian wage rigidity, an explanation for unemployment and for
wage differentials across firms and industries. Katz (1986) provides a review and an eval-
uation of the efficiency wage literature. As far as African countries are concerned, Ezeala
Harrison (1992) and Fafchamps and Söderbom (2006) find empirical evidence in support
of efficiency wage theory.
29The potential role played by non-pecuniary benefits is stressed by Fontaine (2008) and
Bentolila et al. (2010) It is likely that such gains depend somehow on network tightness.
However, the model is agnostic concerning the specific functional form describing this
potential relationship, since the latter is far from being obvious. While this simplifica-
tion entails that tightness explicitly appears only with a negative sign into the worker’s
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utility function, the key point is of course accounting for the net impact of tightness
on it.
30Interestingly enough, Pellizzari (2009) finds wage penalties in Italy and wage premia in
countries like Belgium and the Netherlands.
31It would be very interesting to test our theoretical insights concerning the role played by
informal hiring channels in different institutional contexts, but a systematic cross-country
comparison is beyond the purposes of this paper.
32Sample selection is an issue because we observe wages of workers hired through a social
network only when they were hired through that channel (and never if they were hired
through formal channels).
33Since our focus is on the choice of the hiring channel, variables should refer to the hir-
ing time of each worker. Even though some variables explicitly refer to that time (hiring
channel, type of job, salary and previous experience), the large majority of them concerns
the year of the survey. However, some information obtained in 2003 may well approxi-
mate several variables at the hiring time. For instance, the years of education declared at
the time of the survey are likely to correspond to the years of education at hiring time.
Therefore, we assume that some variables at the firm (size, sector, location, public capital,
and whether the director is also the owner) and the worker (years of education, hours of
work and marital status) level are good proxies for their value at the time hiring occurred.
34We run the same estimation using the hours of work per week to obtain the wage rates
from the monthly salaries. The results are very similar. However, we present the results
obtained for monthly wages in order to avoid any concern of propagation of potential
measurement errors from hours of work to the dependent variable.
35Other potential exclusion restrictions that we tested were the distance to work, in terms
of both minutes and kilometers. However, both measures of distance are weak determi-
nants of the hiring channel.
36Hayashi (2000) precisely cites age as example of a good instrument for wage regressions
that include education and experience in the section dedicated to endogeneity bias of his
textbook on Econometrics (pages 199–200).
37While 40 years old is an arbitrary threshold to proxy old age, adopting age at hiring as
instrument yields virtually the same results (available upon request). Moreover, although
40 years old is quite young, in an African context that represents a reasonable threshold
proxying an elder age as far as the labor market is concerned (life expectancy is about 60
years old in Senegal and the World Health Organization states that the definition of an
elderly person in Africa should be around 50 years of age, from a health point of view).
38Significant wage penalties suffered by workers hired through their relatives are also
found by Nordström Skans and Kramarz (2011).
39Since we do not separately observe the hiring choices of firms and applicants, but
only the outcome of their joint decisions (i.e., that someone is working for a firm), some
caution is needed in interpreting these results. However, the magnitude of coefficients
undoubtedly points to their consistency with a context of favoritism.
40The same result is found for example by Pistaferri (1999).
41An intriguing interpretation is that networks that have served as hiring channel consti-
tute a guarantee of trustworthiness, substitutingmarital status in the formal labor market.
42This finding is coherent with the view that big cities entail weaker social networks, an
idea that dates back to the nineteenth century (see Tönnies 1887 and Simmel 1903) and
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was developed by the social disorganization theory (see Wirth 1938, Redfield 1947 and
Alexander 1966) and the overload theory (see Milgram 1970). For a short and enlighten-
ing discussion on the topic in sociology, see Amato (1993).
43While the qualitative result is intuitive, the magnitude of the coefficients needs to be
taken cum grano salis, since 96% of sampled employees work in Dakar.
44Pistaferri (1999) also finds that large firm are less likely to hire through informal chan-
nels and pay higher wages. More in general, the fact that larger firms tend to pay higher
wages is a well-established finding (see for instance Oi and Idson 1999).
45The finding that workers hired through social networks suffer a wage penalty with
respect to other workers in the Senegalese manufacturing sector might be, at least partly,
compensated by non-monetary gains, which are not captured by the empirical analysis.
46Several empirical studies find evidence of risk pooling within highly clustered networks
in African countries (see for example Barr and Genicot (2008)).
47FIML involves forming the joint distribution of the random variables characterizing the
equations of the model and thenmaximizing the full log-likelihood function. In this paper
the estimation of the switching regression model and the counterfactuals are based on
the FIML algorithm implemented as a Stata program (movestay) by Lokshin and Sajaia
(2004).
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